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RECENT DECISIONS
penal legislation may be practicable to protect individuals or groups
from libelous and insulting attacks upon their religious beliefs. When
applied to blasphemy of the Godhead, however, it is grossly inade-
quate. The statute in the instant case is a legitimate effort of the
duly-chosen officials of the State of New York to prevent the offen-
sive reviling of the Deity. It is respectfully submitted that such an
interest is paramount to the incidental dangers ordinarily inherent in
prior restraints upon speech.
A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - FREEDOm OF SPEECH AND GROUP
LIBEL.-Appellant, convicted of violating a statute' forbidding the
exhibition of lithographs portraying lack of virtue of a class of
citizens,2 contended that the statute contravened the Fourteenth
Amendment because it was vague and unlawfully abridged freedom
of speech and press. On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court, with four Justices dissenting, held that this state law pro-
scribing libels directed at a defined group is constitutional unless it
"is a wilful and purposeless restriction," and that this law, as con-
strued by the state court, provided an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725 (1952).
Libelous utterances were criminal at common law 3 because of
their tendency to provoke a breach of the peace; 4 truth alone, there-
fore, was not a defense.5 As far as groups were concerned, however,
(Purdon, 1930) ; R. I. GEN. LAws c. 610, § 16 (1938) ; VT. REv. STAT. c. 371,
§ 8493 (1947).
1 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 38, § 471 (1951), which states: "It shall be unlawful
for any person . . . to . . . present or exhibit in any public place in this state
any lithograph . . . which publication or exhibition portrays depravity, crim-
inality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color,
creed or religion which said publication or exhibition exposes the citizens of
any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which
is productive of breach of the peace or riots...."
2 The lithograph was framed as a petition, and the specific libel contained
therein was the following warning: "If persuasion and the need to prevent
the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then
the aggressions . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro,
SURFLY WILL." Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725, 740 (1952)
(dissenting opinion).
3 See State v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 34, 38 (1837); Commonwealth v. Clap,
4 Mass. 163, 169 (1808); King v. Summers, 1 Lev. 139, 83 Eng. Rep. 337
(K. B. 1665).
4 Rex v. Saunders, T. Raym. 201, 83 Eng. Rep. 106 (K. B., 1670) ; see
State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266, 269 (1828).
5 Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825); 20 HALs-
BURY's LAws OF ENGLAND 384 (2d ed. 1936).
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the law of criminal libel afforded very limited protection. Notwith-
standing dicta to the contrary,6 courts were unwilling to entertain
group libel prosecutions unless some individual was directly or im-
pliedly libeled.7 It was thought wiser to tolerate the demagogue than
to allow any possible limitation or restraint upon freedom of speech.8
The attitude of the courts, coupled with the activities of profes-
sional hate mongers,9 led to agitation for 10 and the enactment of "
group libel statutes as a means of preventing group disaffection.
Such legislation, however, was susceptible to constitutional attacks
for abridging free speech,12 or for vagueness which would preclude
a successful criminal prosecution. 18
English law specified that ". . . the truth of the matters charged may be
inquired into, but shall not amount to a defence, unless it was for the public
benefit that the said matters charged should be published...." 6 & 7 VicT.
c. 96, 116 (1843).
In the United States the justification for publishing a criminal libel de-
pends upon the law of the particular jurisdiction, e.g., N. Y. PENAL LAW
§ 1342 (provides that publication is justified if the matter is true and was
published with good motive and for justifiable ends). N. Y. CoNST. Art. I,
§ 8 contains a similar justification. This provision was added to the constitu-
tion as a result of People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N. Y. 1804) (prose-
cution for seditious libel).6 See Palmer v. Concord, 48 N. H. 211, 216 (1868) ; Ryckman v. Delavan,
25 Wend. 196 (N. Y. 1840); Sumner v. Buel, 12 Johns. 475, 478 (N. Y.
1815).
, People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 257 (Gen. Sess.
1938) (exhaustive analysis of prior English and American group libel
prosecutions).8 Id. at 154, 4 N. Y. S. 2d at 268.
9 See Note, 61 YALE L. J. 252, 253-254 (1952).
10 See Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 CoRN. L. Q. 261, 293-297 (1950) ; Note,
47 Cot. L. REv. 595, 608-612 (1947) (draft of proposed group libel statute
with both criminal and civil remedies).
11 See Note, 61 YALE L. J. 252, 255-256 (1952).
12 "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent." Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added).
Though this test originated as a dictum in a case involving a federal espionage
act, the Court has reiterated it in cases concerning the constitutionality of state
laws regulating other kinds of speech. For a general discussion of this doc-
trine, see Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis,
52 COL. L. REv. 313 (1952).
In United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, Dennis
v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951), judge Learned Hand reformulated
this test with the statement that the question now is ". . . whether the gravity
of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." See Richardson, Freedom of Ex-
pression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1951).
13 "To compel . . . [men] . . . to guess on peril of indictment . . . to divine
prophetically what the reaction of only partially determinate facts would be
upon the imaginations and desires of purchasers, is to exact gifts that mankind
does not possess." International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216,
223-224 (1914) ; accord, Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948) ; Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939).
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The instant statute was the first' of its kind to be subjected to
a test of constitutionality. 4 The decision in the principal case, there-
fore, is of dual significance: first, it gives constitutional approval ";
to the extension of criminal law to protect racial and religious groups
from being libeled; and, second, it establishes the constitutional
standards by which similar statutes will be gauged.
In deciding this case the Court ignored one of its previous
caveats- i.e., laws regulating civil liberties will be subjected to
stricter tests of constitutionality than those dealing with property
rights ' 6-- and deviated from its policy of according a weak presump-
tion of constitutionality to state statutes regulating civil liberties.17
Asserting that libelous speech is similar to obscene speech, and there-
fore enjoys no constitutional protection,' 8 the Court rejected the ap-
plication of the "clear and present danger" test as necessary to sus-
tain the statute, and concluded its substantive due process inquiry on
a rephrasing of the rule that a legislative judgment determining that
a certain class of speech is punishable because it presents a substan-
tive evil is conclusive on the Court and is constitutional unless it "is
an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police power.... ,9
In its procedural due process inquiry the Court held that the
construction of the statute as "'a form of criminal libel law'" ade-
quately limited it 20 so that it was not void for failure to provide an
14 The statute declared unconstitutional in State v. Klaprott, 127 N. J. L.
395, 22 A. 2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1941), was not a group libel statute. See Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725, 735 n. 23 (1952).
Bevins v. Prindable, 39 F. Supp. 708 (E. D. Ill.), aff'd ner., 314 U. S.
573 (1941), which has been said to have upheld the constitutionality of the
instant statute expressly avoided that issue. Id. at 712.
15",. .. [O]ur finding that the law is not constitutionally objectionable
carries no implication of approval of the wisdom of the legislation or of its
efficacy." Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 14 at 736.
2OUnited States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
'?E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945); West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639 (1943) ; Taylor v. Missis-
sippi, 319 U. S. 583, 589 (1943); see Note, 2 CATu. U. L. Rv. 101, 111
(1952) ; see also 26 ST. JOHN'S L. Rlv. 342, 345 (1952).
Is "Libelous utterances, not being within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech, it is unnecessary . . . to consider the issues behind the phrase
'clear and present danger.' Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech,
for example, may be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances.
Libel, as we have seen, is in the same class." Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra
note 14 at 735; see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572
(1942).
19 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 670 (1925).
Compare the language quoted in the text with that expressed in the prin-
cipal case: ". . . [W]e cannot deny to a State power to punish . . . [libelous
utterances] directed at a defined group, unless we can say that this [is] a
wilful and purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the
State." Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725, 731 (1952).
20 Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 19 at 729; cf. Fox v. Washington,
236 U. S. 273 (1915).
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ascertainable standard of guilt 21 or for penalizing protected speech.22
This construction did not create a new crime but merely extended an
old one,23 thus making it unnecessary for the Illinois court to give
content to words which lacked an inherent meaning, 24 inasmuch as
such words had acquired a determinative meaning through long use.25
Consequently, the statute sufficiently defined the crime so that men
did not have to guess at the illegal conduct, 20 but, at most, ran the
risk of estimating it incorrectly.27
Whether or not this decision is constitutionally sound, the ad-
visability of enacting such remedial legislation might be questioned
unless the need is urgent, because it will tend to discourage construc-
tive criticism.28  Furthermore, in a state such as New York 2 9 other
means are available to protect the social 30 and economic 31 interests
of ethnic and religious groups. It should be clearly recognized, how-
ever, that the wide latitude of unrestricted speech called for applies
to situations where the social, political, and economic interests of de-
fined groups are affected. Where speech is directed at the indi-
viduals of a defined religious group there is less reason for freedom.
But when it consists of attacks against the Deity in whom that group
21 Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 19 at 734; ef. Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U. S. 451 (1939); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497
(1925) ; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216 (1914).
22 Beaubarnais v. Illinois, supra note 19 at 734; but cf. Winters v. New
York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S.
359 (1931).
23Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725, 729 (1952); but cf. Connally
v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926).24 E.g., contempt, derision, and obloquy. See note 1 supra.
25See Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 393 (1932). See Omaechevarria
v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 348 (1918) (where determinative meaning was estab-
lished by custom and general understanding).
28 Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 23 at 729; but cf. Winters v. New
York, supra note 22 at 519; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S.
385 (1926) ; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216 (1914).
27 See Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 377 (1913).
28 The fear of being stigmatized as a group libeler may be sufficient to
deter a member of a particular group from offering severe but constructive
criticism that would ultimately enhance the group's position in society.
29 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1340 (criminal libel). This statute has been con-
strued as not applicable to group libel prosecutions. People v. Edmondson,
168 Misc. 142, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 257 (Gen. Sess. 1938).
s N. Y. CIVIL IGHTS LAW § 40 (provides for equal rights in places of
public accommodation, resort, amusement, hospitalization and education) ; N. Y.
CvWM RIGHTS LAW § 40-b (prohibits refusal of admission to and ejection from
places of entertainment).
s9 N. Y. CIvIL RIGHTs LAW § 40-a (prohibiting inquiry concerning religion
or religious affiliations of persons seeking employment in public schools);
N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 43 (prohibiting discrimination by labor organiza-
tions); N. Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (creation of state agency with power to
prevent discrimination in employment because of race, creed, color or national
origin).
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reposes its belief, the criticism is not constructive and ought legiti-
mately to be inhibited by preventive or remedial enactments.
X
CORPORATIONS-FoREIGN CORPORATIONS-INTEREST OF STOCK-
HioLDERs IN CoRPoRATE. PROPERTY SEIZED BY GOVERNMENT UNDM
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY AcT.-American stockholders of a cor-
poration organized in a neutral country seek to intervene in a suit by
the corporation to recover property seized by the United States under
the provisions of the Trading With the Enemy Act.' Petitioners
claim that the corporation, allegedly dominated by officers in con-
spiracy with Germany during the war, would not adequately protect
their interest in the specific assets. The appellate court denied the
petition, declaring that the stockholders have no legal interest in the
property.2 In reversing, the Court held that when the Government
seizes the assets of a non-enemy foreign corporation, the severable
interest of innocent stockholders in the assets must be fully protected.
Kaufman v. Societe Internationale, 72 Sup. Ct. 611 (1952).
Ecclesiastical corporations, forerunners of the modern corpora-
tion, were born of the necessity of devising a means of holding prop-
erty in perpetuity.3 From this early beginning, the courts later de-
veloped the fiction of a distinct legal entity 4 capable of holding title
to property in its own name, separate from any legal interest in the
stockholders.5 The existence of this corporate entity encouraged
stockholders to invest in business, since they could now do so without
subjecting their personal fortunes to the risks of business. 6
Justice Holmes, in Klein v. Board of Supervisors, spoke of the
corporation as a person and its ownership as "a non-conductor that
makes it impossible to attribute an interest in its property to its
140 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C. App. § 1 et seq. (1946), as amended,
55 STAT. 839 (1941), 50 U. S. C. App. § 4 et seq. (Supp. 1946).
2 Kaufman v. Societe Internationale, 188 F. 2d 1017 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
3 1 FLETCHER, Copo ATIoNs 5 (11th ed. 1931). Presumedly, the aggrega-
tion of parishioners could not take title to the property to insure continuous
succession to the right to utilize the property.
4 See Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 114, 222 N. Y.
Supp. 532, 538 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (excellent summary of the corporate entity
theory in the United States).
5 R. I. Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69 (1926) ; see Warrior
River Terminal Co. v. Alabama, 58 So. 2d 100, 101 (Ala. 1952); Corporation
Comm'r v. Consolidated Stage Co., 63 Ariz. 257, 161 P. 2d 110, 111 (1945) ;
Miller v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 432, 110 P. 2d 419, 421 (1941). See also
BALLANTNF., CoRPoaRAToNs 288 (1946).
6 See Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519 (1924) ; Hanson
v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10 N. E. 2d 259, 263 (1937).
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